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RELATING KANT’S THEORY OF REFLECTIVE 
JUDGMENT TO THE LAW 
RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL

 
One of the most pervasive themes in Kant’s philosophy is that of 
legislation and law. Among the three cognitive faculties of understanding, 
reason, and judgment, the understanding takes pride of place in legislating. 
The understanding is the power that prescribes the general lawfulness of 
nature. It provides us with the a priori categories needed to structure and 
give meaning to the sensuous manifold of our phenomenal consciousness. 
Our experience can be objective and universally valid because we all 
apply the same categorial rules to the contents provided by the senses. The 
application of categorial rules allows us to understand nature as governed 
by laws. 
Whereas the understanding is discursive and examines the world part 
by part, reason is holistic and aims at completeness. Theoretical reason 
tests the truth of each of our cognitive claims by determining how it fits 
into the overall system of what is known. Theoretical reason’s task is not 
to legislate, but to determine whether the particular laws discovered in 
nature can be related to each other in an orderly way to constitute a 
coherent system. In doing so, reason begins to take on a judiciary role. It 
moves from the concept of natural law that the understanding uses to order 
the world to that of judicial law concerned with legitimation. This 
transition is captured by Kant’s image of the tribunal of reason. 
The laws of the understanding formally order our experience by means 
of an external mode of causation that allows no phenomenon to be self-
caused. By contrast, the systematic order demanded by reason produces an 
internal connectedness and involves self-legitimation. We will consider 
how these expectations of reason carry over to the way Kant deals with 
questions of justice and human rights related to the legal sense of law. 
Kant acknowledges his reluctance to let theoretical reason legislate 
when he contrasts it with practical reason. In the Critique of Practical 
Reason, he writes that ―[t]he theoretical use of reason was concerned with 
objects‖ and has a tendency to ―lose itself beyond its boundaries, among 
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unattainable objects‖
1
 unless it is curbed. Practical reason, however, is 
allowed to legislate laws because these laws apply only to ourselves as 
rational beings. According to Kant, practical reason ―can at least suffice to 
determine the will and always has objective reality insofar as volition 
alone is at issue.‖
2
 
He writes that these objective laws ―must sufficiently determine the 
will as will even before I ask whether I have the ability required for a 
desired effect . . . .‖
3
 Practical laws apply to us in so far as we are free 
rational beings capable of self-determination in deciding how to act. This 
is a formal determination. Regarding the subjective maxims we adopt 
relative to achieving desired effects, Kant expects us to evaluate their 
content in order to determine whether they can stand the test of 
universalization. This test requires a ―rule of judgment under laws of pure 
practical reason[,]‖ which is to ―ask yourself whether, if the action you 
propose were to take place by a law of the nature of which you were 
yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will.‖
4
 
The rule is determinant because you must imagine yourself as both the 
legislator and subject of a law that permits no exceptions. As the legislator 
of moral laws, I am autonomous in two senses: First, I determine what the 
law should be. Second, I subject myself to it by considering myself as part 
of that universal domain that can be called the kingdom of ends. 
When we reach the Critique of the Power of Judgment we find that 
judgment is legislative in a more restricted sense, namely, ―with regard to 
the conditions of reflection a priori . . . .‖
5
 Kant writes that judgment’s 
autonomy is not objectively valid ―like that of the understanding, with 
regard to the theoretical laws of nature, or of reason, in the practical laws 
of freedom . . . .‖
6
 The legislative power of judgment is merely 
subjectively valid and prescribes ―solely to itself.‖
7
 Its autonomy is really 
heautonomy: it is reflective rather than determinant. The lawfulness of 
reflective judgment applies only to our own thinking, and does not 
legislate to the world. Reflective judgment is merely self-legislative and 
 
 
 1. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 5:15, at 12 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
1997) (1788) [hereinafter KANT, PRACTICAL REASON] (page references, e.g., 5:15, to the Akademie 
edition). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 5:20, at 18. 
 4. Id. at 5:69, at 60. 
 5. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 20:225, at 27 (Paul Guyer ed., 
Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 2000) [hereinafter KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT] (page references, 
e.g., 20:225, to the Akademie edition). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 20:225, at 28. 
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any more general lawfulness that it can establish will have to be arrived at 
through a consensus within a more limited scope. 
I. THE COMMON TERRITORY OF AESTHETIC CONSENSUS 
Section II of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment provides us 
with an initial orientation that will help to specify what kind of scope or 
meaning reference a judgment can have. Kant states that when judgment 
refers a concept to an object, this object can at the same time be located as 
part of some context. This context can be either: (1) a field (Feld); (2) a 
territory (Boden, territorium); (3) a domain (Gebiet, ditio); or (4) a habitat 
(Aufenthalt, domicilium). 
We find geographical terms like ―field‖ and ―territory‖ being used 
throughout Kant’s corpus, but he does not always distinguish clearly 
amongst them. These contextual spheres often seem to be used 
interchangeably. I think it is one of the defining features of reflective 
judgment to be able to specify these contextual spheres by differentiating 
their scope and nature. Thus, in addition to the well-known contrast 
between a determinant judgment proceeding deductively from universals 
to particulars and a reflective judgment proceeding inductively from a 
particular to an as yet unknown universal, we can say that reflective 
judgments can serve to differentiate the four kinds of contexts that were 
introduced in Section II. Analysis of how Kant explicates this distinction 
shows that a field provides the sphere of what is logically possible and a 
territory of what is actually experienceable. Domains introduce the 
modality of necessity, but will always leave us with habitats of 
contingency that our finite intellect has not been able to fully understand. 
These are local habitats of mere empirical familiarity.
8
 
The beginning of the Critique of Judgment also provides a backward 
glance at the first two Critiques. Kant recounts that the legislative claims 
of the first were about the domain of natural necessity and those of the 
second were about the domain of moral freedom. In both cases it was 
possible to delimit the field of what is logically possible and arrive at 
determinant judgments that allow us to predict natural events on the one 
hand and prescribe moral duties on the other hand. To make room for 
reflective judgment in matters of aesthetic taste, Kant finds it necessary to 
be more explicit about the kind of contexts that judgment can open up. In 
Section III of the Introduction it is indicated that judgments of taste have 
 
 
 8. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, Reflection, Reflective Judgment and Aesthetic Exemplarity, in 
AESTHETICS AND COGNITION IN KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 223 (Rebecca Kukla ed., 2006).  
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as their scope neither the domain of nature nor that of freedom, but the 
actual territory of human experience that these domains have as their 
common base. The flower that we experience as beautiful does not add to 
our knowledge of nature nor does it make any moral demands on us. It 
gives us pleasure, which heightens our awareness of our own habitat. 
There is always something unexpected about aesthetic pleasure that links 
it to the contingency of our own habitat as the place where we happen to 
be. Yet, we find the pleasure expansive and impute it to all human beings. 
An aesthetic judgment is a kind of reflective judgment that has the 
capacity to relate the habitat of the individual subject to the territory of 
what is common to human subjects. 
Because the pleasure in beauty that enlivens my own habitat cannot be 
communicated to others with available concepts, aesthetic judgment 
locates a more basic and formal mode of communicability in feeling itself. 
This means that the lawfulness associated with the aesthetic judgment is a 
lawfulness without a determinate law. It is the lawfulness of attaining a 
felt agreement between individual sense and common sense. In this paper, 
I will exploit this reflective relation between a local habitat and a broader 
territory of commonality for legal purposes as well. What I have 
characterized as the contextualized sense of lawfulness opened up by 
reflective judgment will now be considered for its legal import. Can 
reflective judgment be made useful, not just for the subjective territory of 
experience, but also for the political territory of a nation when new laws 
are needed? Whereas moral laws derive from reason and are universal, the 
legal systems of particular nation-states must also address specific 
conditions that change over time. 
II. ATTAINING A LEGAL CONSENSUS 
When we turn to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals we will be able to point 
to reflective or aesthetic analogies in Part Two on moral virtue. No such 
reflective analogies are found in Part One on judicial law. But our 
discussion about how reflective judgment can relate habitat and territory 
does become applicable to Part One once we reach Kant’s treatment of 
property rights. 
Whereas the ethical laws of morality bind us internally, judicial laws 
bind us externally and have a mere legal force. Judicial laws define what is 
right or just in a collective sense and are only derivatively about individual 
rights. Kant writes: ―[r]ight [or justice (Recht)] is . . . the sum of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/9
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conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.‖
9
 Morality is about 
our moral decisions and their universalizability. Right or justice goes 
further and considers the ―external and indeed practical relation of one 
person to another, insofar as their actions (Handlungen), as deeds (Facta), 
can have . . . influence on each other.‖
10
 An individual’s right to perform a 
deed must be curtailed if it encroaches on the life-sphere of others and 
interferes with their freedom. Kant’s worry about mutual infringement is 
so strong that he shifts from the language of moral constraint to that of 
judicial coercion. Judicial law is defined as the ―law of reciprocal 
coercion‖ and must be constructed ―with mathematical exactitude.‖
11
 
Whereas the principles of morality can only be conceptually deduced, the 
principles of right or justice can be constructed intuitively. 
Kant speaks of both innate and acquired right. There is only one innate 
right according to him, namely, ―freedom . . . insofar as it can coexist with 
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law . . . .‖
12
 
Acquired rights require further conditions for them to be established. We 
can illustrate this difference through his account of how the right of 
possession must be legitimated. Kant claims that all human beings 
originally possess the earth as a common territory. This amounts to the 
right of human beings ―to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their 
will) has placed them.‖
13
 The natural right to occupy a specific habitat in 
this earthly territory (Boden)
14
 does not however entail the further right to 
stay there and turn that contingent habitat (Aufenthalt) into one’s property 
(Besitz) or more lasting residence (Sitz).
15
 Similarly, the natural right to 
possess a corporeal thing in space is provisional and can only be 
transformed into an enduring individual right under certain normative 
conditions. 
Here again contextual reflection takes on a fundamental significance. 
Kant notes that if the earth were an ―unbounded plane, people could be so 
dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one 
another . . . .‖
16
 It is because the earth is a spherical surface that the 
 
 
 9. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:230, at 24 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, MORALS] (page references, e.g., 6:230, to the original format). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 6:232–33, at 26. 
 12. Id. at 6:238, at 30. 
 13. Id. at 6:262, at 50. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
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problem of community must be confronted. The earth is a bounded 
territory that provides a supporting ground for all people. It is a common 
resource of limited extent and therefore the individual use of any part of it 
must be regulated by a community. 
Rightful and lasting ownership of any part of this earth—whether this 
be land or the things it supports comes with the obligation to justify using 
it as one’s own without depriving others of their rights. The question that 
must be answered is whether the freedom of an individual to acquire 
something can legitimately coexist with the freedom of others. According 
to Kant, there are three moments in the process of legitimizing this kind of 
acquisition (Erwerbung) of property. They can be considered as reflective 
moments because they involve putting a claim in context. As we proceed 
through the three moments the scope of legitimacy will become 
comparatively greater. 
The first moment of acquisitive legitimation is simply apprehending 
(Apprehension) ―an object that belongs to no one‖ so that it does not 
―conflict with another’s freedom . . . .‖
17
 Apprehending an object is a 
unilateral act of grasping something that no one else is holding. The basis 
for this claim is that no one else is presently making a similar claim. But 
this may only mean that from the limited perspective of my ―habitat‖ I 
cannot see any counterclaim. It is a phenomenal claim in which 
apprehension (Apprehension) as physical grasping is just as limited in 
scope as a perspectival act of visual apprehension (Auffassung). 
The second moment of taking ownership involves designating an 
object as mine by an ―act of choice (Willkür) to exclude everyone else 
from it.‖
18
 Since Kant calls this an act of Bezeichnung, phenomenal 
possession becomes a ―designative possession‖ whereby I declare to any 
other self that what was originally apprehended, or taken control of, 
should stay mine—even if he or she will enter my habitat and would like 
to remain there. Designative possession can be seen as a bilateral 
declaration addressed to anyone who might subsequently be in a position 
to occupy and possess it. This second moment points to the realization that 
proper ownership is not merely a case of being able to hold on to 
something (Inhabung), but of having it (Habens) under my control 
(Gewalt)
19
 even when I am somewhere else and no longer able to 
physically hold on to it. To designate a plot of land as mine is to make it 
my maxim to continue to claim possession of it against any potential 
 
 
 17. Id. at 6:258, at 47.  
 18. Id. at 6:259, at 47–48. 
 19. See id. at 6:253, at 42. 
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counterclaim by another self. The justification could be the maxim to use 
my controlling power to grow crops that can provide food for my family. 
Although such a maxim is a product of free choice (Willkür), it does 
not have the necessity of law, which is a function of will (Wille). Thus 
lawful entitlement requires a third moment of ―[a]ppropriation 
([Zueignung=]appropriatio) as an act of a general will [Willens]‖
20
 that 
assures external consent. Only when my choice to acquire something can 
be normatively justified as compatible with the general will of the 
community can it truly be legitimate. This third or appropriative moment 
involves an omnilateral claim and amounts to what Kant calls an act of 
noumenal possession. To have an object legitimately as a ―possessio 
noumenon‖
21
 is to have individual ownership publicly endorsed as 
compatible with the freedom of all. But this public legitimation needs the 
consent of a civil constitution of a nation-state and the laws reflecting the 
general will of its people. The territorial possession of the earth in 
general—originally an abstract but universal natural right—has now been 
delimited as a concrete and legitimate individual right to a part of this 
earth granted by a civil territorial community. With the third moment of 
appropriation a private right gains the status of being part of a public right. 
The initial phase of apprehending an object involves both cognizing it 
as a phenomenal object and grasping or treating it ―as a material thing in 
itself (Sache an sich selbst).‖
22
 The final phase of appropriating it is to 
make it an ―intelligible thing in itself (Ding an sich selbst)‖ on the basis of 
a civil constitution.
23
 Kant assigns a material object a ―noumenal‖ status if 
its availability for the free use of a subject is authorized by a constitution 
as being compatible with the freedom of all other subjects in the civil 
condition. When we attain proper legal ownership of material objects then 
our relationship to them is noumenal in a normative rather than 
transcendent sense. The intelligibility of legitimately appropriated objects 
is thought to be derivable from an omnilateral insight into their proper use 
in a nation-state governed by laws. The possession of my habitat can only 
be legitimate if it is integrated into a territory that can function in a 
domain-like way and establish positive laws regulating competing 
empirical claims.  
This ability to legitimate what is the case at the local level of a habitat 
in relation to a larger territorial perspective assumes the use of reflective 
 
 
 20. Id. at 6:259, at 47 (translation revised). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 6:249, at 39 (translation revised). 
 23. Id. at 6:371, at 137 (translation revised). 
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judgment even though its role is not mentioned. The precedent for this 
assumption lies in the fact that the reflective aesthetic judgment (Urteil) is 
also an evaluation (Beurteilung). This transformation is quite explicit in 
section nine of the Critique of Judgment where Kant differentiates the 
evaluative nature of aesthetic universality from theoretical universality. 
Kant writes: 
[T]he aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a judgment must . . . 
be of a special kind, since the predicate of beauty is not connected 
with the concept of the object considered in its entire logical sphere 
[Sphäre] and yet it extends [the predicate] over the whole sphere of 
those who judge.
24
 
When we attribute beauty to an object, we do not assign it another 
determinate objective property such as color, size, or shape to distinguish 
it from other possible objects in our field of vision or the domain of 
scientific cognition. Instead, the predicate of beauty reflectively relates a 
work of art to the sphere of human beings who are able to evaluate it. A 
reflective judgment of taste requires a contextual re-configuration from 
objective to intersubjective universality. 
A pure or proper judgment of taste must come through a social 
engagement with others. The aesthetic pleasure we gain from a thing of 
beauty should be a communicable sentiment rather than a private 
sensation. Accordingly, Kant asserts that it would be self-contradictory to 
assign the universal communicability of a felt aesthetic pleasure directly to 
―the representation through which [its] object is given.‖
25
 Instead, ―it is the 
universal communicability of the state of mind in the given representation 
which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as 
its ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence.‖
26
 The 
difference here concerns the way in which the object being judged is 
contextualized. The sensuous pleasure derivable from the directly 
represented object refers merely to the limited locale or habitat of my own 
inner sense. The aesthetically apprehended object is indicative of the 
larger territory of what can be humanly shared, and the resulting pleasure 
is reflective and follows from my consenting to be part of this territory. 
Aesthetic pleasure is about what can be humanly shared about things 
without needing to possess them. It also stands as the counterpart to the 
 
 
 24. KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT, supra note 5, at 5:215, at 100 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 25. Id. at 5:217, 102. 
 26. Id. (translation revised). 
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legal ideal of sharing possessions needed for individual use through their 
fair distribution. For Kant, aesthetic communicability is premised on our 
ability to temporarily suspend our private interests and arrive at 
disinterested judgments. This suspension can only occur when we have the 
leisure to contemplate beautiful things. The corresponding problem of 
attaining legal consensus arises in the workaday world where most 
individual and communal practical interests cannot be suspended and need 
to be contextually reconciled. This difference will show itself in the ways 
aesthetic judgments and legal judgments impute agreement. 
III. ASCRIPTIVE AND ATTRIBUTIVE MODES OF IMPUTATION 
According to Kant, a disinterested aesthetic judgment ―does not 
postulate the accord of everyone (only a logically universal judge can do 
that, since it can adduce grounds); it only imputes (sinnt an) this 
agreement to everyone . . . .‖
27
 Because it cannot demonstrate its necessity 
conceptually, the aesthetic judgment merely imputes its universality in a 
formal ascriptive way. This ascriptive sense of imputation (Ansinnung) 
found in the Critique of Judgment reflects an anticipated consensus.
28
 (But 
in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces stronger senses of 
imputation (Zurechnung) that point to what I will call ―attributive‖ modes 
of imputation. These attributions indicate how we hold ourselves and 
others accountable for our practical decisions and deeds as human agents 
operating within the constraints of a community.) 
The way Kant defines imputation in The Metaphysics of Morals opens 
up some of the possible permutations of attribution and is worth citing in 
its entirety: 
Imputation (imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which 
someone is regarded as the author (causa libera) of an action, which 
is then called a deed (factum) and stands under laws. If the 
judgment also carries with it the [legal (rechtlichen)] consequences 
of this deed, it is an imputation having [a legal or] rightful force 
(imputatio iudiciaria s. valida); otherwise it is merely an imputation 
[evaluating] the deed (imputatio diiudicatoria)—The (natural or 
moral) person that is authorized to impute with rightful force is 
called a judge or a court (iudex s. forum).
29
 
 
 
 27. Id. at 5:216, at 101 (translation revised). 
 28. See id. at 5:214–16, at 99–102. 
 29. KANT, MORALS, supra note 9, at 6:227, at 19 (citation and footnotes omitted). 
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We have here a complex set of imputations that will repay further 
analysis. Kant’s first sentence is about moral imputation. It assigns 
responsibility to someone for an action that is attributed to be a factual 
deed standing under moral laws. The second sentence goes beyond 
attributing formal responsibility by also considering the substantive 
consequences of the deed. If the judgment has rightful force 
(rechtskräftig), then it counts as a legal imputation that has judicial 
(iudiciaria) legitimacy; otherwise it is an evaluation that has a dijudicative 
(diiudicatoria) status. The third sentence goes on to locate the authority to 
impute with rightful force in a natural person (judge) or moral person 
(court). The courtroom judge can thus be said to have the right to 
adjudicate. 
Kant does not specify what is involved in evaluative dijudication 
(imputatio diiudicatoria) and seems more interested in the judicial 
legitimacy of adjudication. But in the following paragraph, he launches a 
discussion of the merits and demerits of human deeds that can be seen as 
allowing for the application of evaluative dijudication. One of the 
meanings of the word ―dijudicate‖ is to ―decide between‖ or weigh 
alternatives. When the merits and demerits of a deed are being evaluated 
or dijudicated there are, for Kant, three relevant alternatives among which 
to decide: a person can (1) do exactly what the law requires; (2) do more 
than what the law expects of him, which is meritorious; or (3) to his 
demerit, do less than the law requires. If it is determined that the agent has 
fallen short, there is ―culpability (Verschuldung)‖ and then a ―judge 
(Richter)‖ must adjudicate or make the final decision to direct (richten) 
what is to be done to set things right.
30
 The ―courtroom (Gerichtshof)‖ 
establishes the authoritative context for rendering a determinant verdict 
concerning ―the rightful consequences‖ of the deed.
31
 
In the above sequence, dijudication was part of the legal process of 
correctly subsuming a deed under the law and arriving at a legitimate 
determinant judgment. But a few paragraphs later Kant begins to consider 
 
 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. Onora O’Neill has claimed that determinant and reflective judgments are theoretical 
rather than practical. She argues that practical judgments are neither determinant nor reflective because 
they involve a decision about future action. When deciding what to do, there is not yet a given to the 
judge as in the case of standard determinant and reflective judgments. See Onora O’Neill, Experts, 
Practitioners, and Practical Judgement, 4 J. MORAL PHIL. 154, 154–66 (2007). 
 But not all practical judgments are future directed. A legal verdict is a determinant judgment about 
a given deed that clearly has practical consequences. It seems equally true that certain reflective 
judgments about past human achievements can also have practical import. 
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―the degree to which an action can be imputed.‖
32
 This calls for a different 
kind of evaluative dijudication, one which seems to require reflective 
judgment. In considering the degree of merit or demerit to be imputed, 
judgment must use reflection to compare and contrast relevant factors, 
such as obstacles faced and sacrifices made by agents, as well as their 
subjective state of mind. 
Such situational factors are not considered relevant in determining 
objective guilt, but they may be considered when deciding the appropriate 
punishment. Kant points our attention to this when he discusses the 
problem of how to punish the deed of killing someone in a duel. Since 
both parties consented to the duel to defend their honor, Kant claims that 
the one who kills his opponent cannot strictly be accused of murder. Here 
a court of law must either ―declare by law that the concept of honor (which 
is here no illusion) counts for nothing and so punish with death, or else it 
must remove from the crime the capital punishment appropriate to it, and 
so be either cruel or indulgent.‖
33
 Kant describes this legal quandary as a 
problem of a ―barbarous and undeveloped‖ penal code that results in a 
―discrepancy between the incentives of honor in the people (subjectively) 
and the measures that are (objectively) suitable for its purpose. 
[Accordingly,] the public justice arising from the state becomes an 
injustice from the perspective of the justice arising from the people.‖
34
 
Even though it is in the interest of the state to punish the surviving duelist 
to discourage other duels, the subjective need that human individuals have 
for honor should temper the punishment. 
Kant praises the man of honor as valuing something ―even more highly 
than life . . . .‖
35
 He should therefore not be punished for the crime of 
killing someone in the same way that a scoundrel is punished. But Kant’s 
example of the duel does not confront all the complexities involved in 
arriving at an appropriate punishment. The duel represents a special 
situation or context that brackets out the world at large. Here we have a 
conflict between legal standards of justice and a social convention of 
honor that applies only to a certain class of people. But in evaluating 
human deeds there are many more competing influences that need to be 
diagnosed. Thus when Kant speaks of the degree of ―merit or service the 
agent can be credited with (zum Verdienst angerechnet werden kann)‖
36
 
 
 
 32. KANT, MORALS, supra note 9, at 6:228, at 19. 
 33. Id. at 6:336, at 109. 
 34. Id. at 6:337, at 109. 
 35. Id. at 6:334, at 107. 
 36. Id. at 6:228, at 19–20 (translation revised). 
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the diagnostic use of reflective judgment becomes even more essential. In 
addition to the constraining normative conditions that regulate the 
performance of human tasks, there are also restraining contextual factors 
that need to be assessed to determine how much of an obstacle they have 
presented. 
IV. DUTIES TO OTHER HUMAN BEINGS AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 
The import of the aesthetic and reflective aspects of judgment for 
morality becomes more evident when Kant moves from the ―Doctrine of 
Right‖ to the ―Doctrine of Virtue.‖ There he distinguishes between the 
direct moral duties previously discussed and the indirect duties associated 
with moral virtue. Most interesting in this regard is the section entitled 
―Aesthetic Preconceptions Concerning the Mind’s Receptivity to Concepts 
of Duty as Such.‖
37
 Kant refers us to certain aesthetic ―predispositions . . . 
for being affected by concepts of duty‖ such as ―moral feeling, conscience, 
love of one’s neighbor and respect for oneself . . . .‖
38
 Here Kant again 
adjusts the scope of his concern to focus on the human element of practical 
reason. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that ―a human being can . . . have 
no duty to any beings other than human beings; and if he thinks he has 
such duties, it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of 
reflection . . . .‖
39
 Here the reflective scope of moral judgment is limited to 
human persons. Any duties to a pure rational being such as God or an 
irrational animal are indirect. This reflective narrowing of contextual 
scope is at the same time a qualitative discernment about the kind of being 
that can be assigned virtue. The only beings that we can have moral duties 
to, and make moral demands of, are other human beings. It would be 
inappropriate to include God and animals in the human community of 
mutual expectations. It is presumptious to make demands on God and 
moral standards clearly do not apply to irrational animals. 
As part of the section on duties owed to other human beings, Kant 
revisits the question of sympathy that he had discussed in the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals. There he found sympathy an inadequate 
basis for making ethical decisions because it leads us to favor those that 
are familiar to us and similar to us. But in The Metaphysics of Morals he 
discusses it again as part of a larger examination about ―shared feeling 
 
 
 37. Id. at 6:399, at 159 (translation revised). 
 38. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 39. Id. at 6:442, at 192. 
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(Mitgefühl).‖
40
 Nature has implanted in us a ―receptivity 
(Empfänglichkeit)‖ for the feeling of sympathy as part of our disposition to 
humanity, but we can also cultivate this disposition as the ―capacity 
(Vermögen)‖ and willingness to share in the feelings of others. To the 
extent that we are merely receptive to others we feel sympathy. The moral 
challenge is to develop a more active counterpart to sympathy, namely, ―a 
participatory feeling (theilnehmende Empfindung)‖
41
 like benevolence. 
The German word for sympathy is Mitleid and means ―suffering with.‖ 
Sympathy as a mode of suffering is unfree. The passive root of sympathy 
is objectionable to Kant and entails that there can be no duty to feel 
sympathy for others or act based on sympathy. The new expression 
―theilnehmende Empfindung‖ introduced in The Metaphysics of Morals is 
often translated as ―sympathetic feeling,‖ but I think that this risks 
confusing it with the sympathy that he finds inadequate. I am translating it 
as ―participatory feeling‖ to bring out its more active character. It is a free 
feeling that is not passively received, but a spontaneous expression of 
―practical humanity (humanitas practica).‖
42
 Thus Kant goes on to claim 
that we should be involved in the fate of others through ―an active moral 
participation (thätige Theilnehmung)‖
43
 and we can do so by means of an 
indirect duty to cultivate shared feelings that are initially aesthetic in 
nature. Their active cultivation is needed to assure their broadest possible 
application. But there is no determinantly prescribed formula about how 
far to translate benevolence into beneficent deeds. Here there is a certain 
amount of latitude that calls for reflective judgment.  
I have focused on the role of participatory feelings in the pursuit of 
moral virtue because they can also contribute to the open interchange that 
Kant considers conducive to the public consensus needed to reform the 
existing laws of civic states. Moreover, this kind of public debate can 
prepare human beings to move toward a more cosmopolitan federation of 
states that will enhance the possibility of world peace. We started with the 
image of the critique of pure reason as a tribunal or court of justice. The 
task of this tribunal is ultimately self-directed and must include ―judging 
[or evaluating (beurteilen)] what is lawful in reason in general . . . .‖
44
 
Without this reflective self-scrutiny, reason would be in a warlike ―state of 
 
 
 40. Id. at 6:456, at 204. 
 41. Id. (translation revised). 
 42. Id. (translation revised). 
 43. Id. at 6:457, at 205 (translation revised). 
 44. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A751/B779, at 649 trans. (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood 
eds. & trans., 1997) (page references, e.g., A751/B779, to the pagination of the first (A) and second 
(B) editions) (footnote omitted). 
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nature,‖ according to Kant. A judicious critique that ―derives all decisions 
from the ground rules of its own institution‖ will make possible what Kant 
calls ―the peace of a legal order.‖
45
 We saw that the state of nature can 
only offer us a temporary habitat that is under constant threat. A civil 
(bürgerliche) community can give us the right to a more lasting residence. 
Finally, a cosmopolitan (weltbürgerliche) legal federation of states is 
needed to assure the permanent peaceful coexistence with all humans. 
The legislative sense of law that characterizes Kant’s first two 
Critiques shows what conditions must be met to assure that every 
constituent within an ideal context or domain will be treated equally. The 
evaluative and judicial sense of law that we have related to reflective 
judgment in the third Critique and carried forward to the philosophy of 
right has the more difficult task of reconciling the conflicting interests that 
manifest themselves in more confined regional contexts. The more limited 
the territorial resources of a civil nation-state are found to be, the more 
urgent the legal problem of fair distribution becomes. 
 
 
 45. See id. (translation revised). 
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